Abstract-We consider wireless communication between Alice and Bob when the intermediate space between Alice and Bob is controlled by Eve. That is, our model divides the channel noise into two parts, the noise generated during the transmission and the noise generated in the detector. Eve is allowed to control the former, but is not allowed to do the latter. While the latter is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable, the former is not assumed to be a Gaussian random variable. In this situation, using backward reconciliation and the random sampling, we propose a protocol to generate secure keys between Alice and Bob under the assumption that Eve's detector has a Gaussian noise and Eve is out of Alice's neighborhood. In our protocol, the security criteria are quantitatively guaranteed even with finite block-length code based on the evaluation of error of the estimation of channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, secure wireless communication attracts much attention as a practical method to realize physical layer security [1] , [2] , [3] . In particular, wire-tap channel model [4] is considered as a typical model for physical layer security. In the wire-tap channel model, the authorized sender, Alice is willing to transmit her message to the authorized receiver, Bob without any information leakage to the adversary, Eve. In this case, we usually assume that the noise in the channel to Eve is larger than that in the channel to Bob. However, it is not easy to guarantee this assumption under the real wireless communication. In cryptography, it is usual to consider that the adversary, Eve is more powerful than the authorized users, Alice and Bob in some sense like RSA cryptography. However, the above wire-tap channel requires the opposite assumption. So, it does not necessarily have sufficient powers of conviction to assume the above wire-tap channel in real wireless communication.
Instead of wire-tap channel model, we often employ secure key agreement, in which, Alice and Bob generate the agreed secure key from their own correlated random variables [5] , [6] . This problem has a similar problem when they generate secure keys via one-way communication from Alice to Bob, because they need to assume that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is larger than that between Alice and Eve. Further, although there exist proposals to generate secure key from wireless communication, they do not give a quantitative security evaluation for the final keys under a reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve in a finite-length setting.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a protocol to generate quantitatively secure keys between Alice and Bob under a reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve. Since quantum key distribution [7] aims such a purpose without any assumption except for physical laws, the protocol of this paper can be regarded as an alternative of quantum key distribution under a reasonable assumption by using cheaper devices. Since quantum key distribution assumes public channel, Alice and Bob are allowed to use public channel in the first step of this paper. However, Eve might override the signals to Bob or the public channel for spoofing [3] . We explain a method to avoid such attack. Further, for efficient realization of the protocol, we additionally impose the following requirements.
(R1) The security of final keys is guaranteed quantitatively based on acceptable criterion even for cryptography community (e.g. the variational distance criterion [9] or the modified mutual information criterion) even though Eve takes the optimal strategy under the above assumption. Additionally, the formula to derive the security evaluation has sufficiently small calculation complexity. (R2) The calculation complexity of the whole protocol (Protocol 1 given in Section IV) is sufficiently small. This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we rigorously explain our purpose and our assumption in Section II. As the next step, before proceeding to our protocol, we discuss the mathematical structure of our model in Section III. Section IV gives our concrete secure protocol by assuming the public channel. In the end of Section IV, we briefly explain the solution for spoofing. Section V numerically discusses a typical case. All of the detailed discussions and the precise definitions are given in [14] .
II. PURPOSE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Recall that the aim of this paper is to propose a protocol to generate quantitatively secure keys between Alice and Bob under a reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve. Here, our aim is not to always generate secure keys, but is to detect the existence of eavesdropping with high probability when it exists. That is, when they consider there is no eavesdropper, their keys are required to be matched and secret. In other word, it is required to discard their keys when an eavesdropper exists.
Here, the case without eavesdropper means the case when the operation of the eavesdropper cannot be distinguished from the natural phenomena. So, the natural case, i.e., the case with the natural phenomena, is very important in our analysis.
In the real setting, it is difficult to identify where Eve attacks the communication between Alice and Bob except for Alice's neighborhood and Bob's detector. To guarantee the security of the final keys in such a setting, it is natural to assume the following conditions to achieve the above purpose.
( 
Here, due to Assumptions (A2), (A3), and (A4), X 1 and X 2 are standard Gaussian random variables, Y is a random variable with average 0, and the coefficients a B , b B , e B , a E , b E , and e E are constants with physical meaning as Fig. I . Here, Y does not necessarily obey the Gaussian distribution. Even though we put e E to be 0, there is no information loss. So, we consider only the case when e E is 0 for simplicity. Further, since the intermediate space between Alice and Bob is controlled by Eve due to Assumption (A1), the information Y can be injected by Eve as Fig. 1 . Here, to discuss the situation advantageous to Eve, we assume that Eve's detection has no noise except for the noise inside of her detector as Eq. (2). Thus, Eve knows the value of Y as well as E. This attack is the best strategy for Eve under Assumptions (A1)-(A4), and is called noise injecting attack because Eve injects the noise Y in this attack.
When Eve is closer to Alice than Bob and the performance of Eve's detector is the same as that of Bob's, the signal-noise ratio of Eve is not smaller than that of Bob so that secure communication with forward reconciliation is impossible. To overcome this problem, this paper considers reverse reconciliation under Assumptions (A1)-(A4). The protocol will be given in Section IV.
Here, we discuss the meaning of coefficients a B and a E more deeply. The coefficients a B and a E express the attenuation. The intensities a On the other hand, the coefficients b B and b E can be lower bounded by the performance of their detectors due to Assumption (A2). As explain in Section IV, our protocol contains random sampling. Hence, the coefficient a B can be estimated as covariance c AB between A and B in the random sampling, which provides a better estimate than the method based spatial relation between Alice and Bob. Thus, the meaning of these parameters can be summarized in Table  I , while the parameter v Y will be introduced in Section III.
III. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE
Before proceeding to our protocol, we discuss the mathematical structure of our model. Firstly, we prepare the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Assume the models (1) and (2) . Also, we assume that the random variables X 1 , X 2 , and A are independent standard Gaussian random variables and Y is an independent variable with average 0. Then, we have the following relation
where
e + y, and P X|E =e is the conditional distribution for X when E is e . Also, P B|E =e is the Gaussian distribution with average e + e B and variance
This theorem implies that the noise injecting attack can be reduced to the attack only with the random variable E . Proof. We introduce the random variable F := b E A − a E X 2 , which is a Gaussian random variable independent of E, Y , and X 1 because their covariances with F are zero. Its variance is b To evaluate the amount of the information leaked to Eve, we need to estimate the distribution P E of the random variable E . However, we can directly estimate only the distribution P A c of the random variable
, we can estimate the distribution P E by applying the Gaussian convolution to the distribution P A c . However, when
, we cannot apply this method. Indeed, we can estimate the distribution P E by applying the Gaussian deconvolution, which is the inverse operation of the Gaussian convolution. But, it is quite difficult to estimate the amount of the error of our estimate of the distribution P E when we employ the Gaussian deconvolution. Since our evaluation of the amount of leaked information requires the evaluation of the amount of error in the estimation of the distribution, we employ the distribution P A c instead of the distribution P E as follows.
In this case, we introduce two independent standard Gaussian random variables Z 1 and Z 2 so that we have another 
z. Also, P B|E =e is the Gaussian distribution with average e + e B and variance a 2 B . Since Eve with this model is more powerful than Eve with the original model, it is enough to evaluate the security with this model. Due to (4), the security in this model can be discussed by using the distribution P E . Since the distribution of b B X 1 is the same as that of
the distribution of P E equals to the distribution P A c . In this way, we can evaluate the amount of leaked information based on the distribution P A c . timates, Alice and Bob apply the backward secure key distillation protocol for n data, which will be explained as Protocol 2.
IV. PROTOCOL
The whole protocol for noise injecting attack is given as Protocol 1, which runs Protocol 2 (backward secure key distillation protocol) as a subprotocol. Before Protocol 2, we discuss secure key distillation protocols. Although there exist several methods to asymptotically attain the optimal one way key distillation rate from Gaussian random variables by using suitable discretization, no protocol distills secure keys from Gaussian random variables satisfying the following conditions.
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(1)
The whole calculation complexity is not so large. (2) A security evaluation of the final key is available with finite block-length. Since the difficulty of its efficient construction is caused by the continuity, we employ very simple discretization in our protocol. Before describing the secure key distillation protocol, we prepare notations for hash functions. We consider a randomized function f H from F n1 2 to F n2 2 , where H is the random variable identifying the function f H , and m 1 := n 1 − n 2 and n 2 are called the sacrifice bit length and the output length, respectively. Alice and Bob need to prepare random seeds H to identity the function f H . The seeds H is allowed to be leaked to Eve. A randomized function f H is called a universal2 hash function when the collision probability satisfies the inequality
for any distinct elements c = c ∈ F n1 2 [11] , [12] . In the above equation, Pr expresses the probability with respect to the choice of H. Under these preparations, we give our protocol satisfying the above conditions (1) and (2) as Protocol 2. The paper [14, (33) , (34)] explains how to choose the sacrifice bit length m 1 from the observed values to satisfy a given security level with a proper definition of security criterion without assuming that Y is Gaussian. The precise meaning of the obtained security is also explained in the paper [14] .
Thanks to the step of Error verification, we do not need to evaluate the decoding error probability in the step of information reconciliation. That is, we do not need to care about the estimation error in the step of information reconciliation. However, we need to be careful for the estimation error in the step of privacy amplification because no method can evaluate the amount of information leaked to Eve in the final keys without use of the estimation error.
Rigorously, in this protocol, Eve might override the signals to Bob or the public channel for spoofing [3] . To avoid Eve's spoofing, Alice and Bob need to authenticate each other [11] , [12] , [13] . They can authenticate each other by using universal2 hash function, which consumes a small number of secret keys between Alice and Bob. Since the length of the keys for the authentication is smaller than the length of generated keys, they can increase the length of the secret keys efficiently. When we consume k bits for the authentication for n-bit transmission, the authentication scheme is secure with a failure probability of n2 −k+1 [13, Theorem 9] . So, If Alice and/or Bob find disagreement, they consider that there exists spoofing and discard the obtained random variable. Then, this protocol well works totally.
Finally, we discuss the effects of the stochastic behaviors of the coefficients a B and a E due to fading. Even though this condition does not necessarily hold even in the average case with respect to this stochastic behavior, Alice and Bob might be able to efficiently generate secure keys. In this case, Alice and Bob need to assign a E to the maximum value among possible values. On the other hand, by random sampling, they can observe whether each coding block can generate secure keys. Hence, there might be a possibility that a part of coding 
Alice applies the error correction to the . If the noise Y generated in the transmission is not zero, the mutual information between A and E is larger than that between A and B. So, the forward information reconciliation cannot generate any keys. However, when we employ the reverse information reconciliation, there is a possibility to generate secure keys. When v Y <
